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Business in troubled waters: Does adverse 
attitude affect firm value? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that multinational firms face considerable adjustment costs 
arising from information asymmetry, differential treatment from the host country, country 
risk, etc., when setting up operations in foreign markets (Eden and Miller, 2004).  In a 
leading theory of foreign direct investment (FDI), Hymer (1976) finds that multinational 
corporations (MNCs) invest only if the benefits of firm-specific advantages outweigh the 
relative costs of operating abroad. Dunning (1988) developed an eclectic theory of FDI in 
which such firm-specific advantages can arise from (i) privileged access to resources, 
technology, economies of scale and scope, etc. (ownership advantage), and/or (ii) intra-firm 
transfers of firms’ tangible and intangible assets, including product and process technology, 
network coordination, work and managerial expertise, advertising, marketing and 
distribution skills, brand names and parent reputation advantages (internalization).  This 
latter advantage, internalization, suggests that multinational firms can create value 
through the internal transfer of assets when transactions costs of doing so within the firm 
are smaller than transferring these assets through external markets. 
For a multinational corporation (MNC), many of the benefits of internalization are 
location specific, thus depending on the political climate, government policies, trade policies, 
national attitude, language, and culture of the host country (Dicken, 1992). Internalization 
may not provide value to an MNC whose operations are entirely in countries similar to the 
MNC’s country of origin. In fact, the greater the market imperfection and uncertainty, the 
greater is the incentive and advantage for a firm to perform the function of the market 
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itself by internalizing market transactions. This process mostly involves intra-firm 
transfers of intangibles because of their public-good characteristics that are easily 
transmitted across national borders. For example, given the huge cost of R&D, a firm has 
incentives to retain technology and exploit it directly on a world-wide basis, rather than sell 
or lease it to foreign firms. Empirical research shows internalization raises firm value by 
alleviating the agency costs associated with operating in multiple countries (Williamson, 
1975, Morck and Yeung, 1991). However, not explored in the extant finance literature is 
how internalization affects firm value of US MNCs when market imperfections and 
uncertainties arise due to animosity toward the US and its policies.  
To this end, we employ a new way of measuring multinationality in terms of 
geographic diversification into non-US-friendly countries, i.e. the level of Anti-Americanism 
in the countries in which a firm operates.  A US firm expanding into only US-friendly 
countries may not have the same value from internalization as firms operating in countries 
with greater anti-Americanism.  We show that the value arising from intangible assets 
increases with the degree of market imperfection from variation in the host country’s 
attitude toward the foreign firm’s country of origin (the US). Specifically, we find that the 
US MNCs that operate in countries with less favorable views of America benefit the most 
from internalizing markets for the transfer of intangible assets. Therefore, this paper is the 
first to measure multinationality and geographic diversification in the context of 
internalization theory and provides a better understanding of internalization and the value 
effects of multinationality. 
The recent Pew Global Attitudes Survey indicates that there has been a substantial 
decline in the image of the US in many parts of the world in recent years, in part due to 
unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The same survey also reveals that people’s 
attitudes toward the US in countries such as India and South Korea have registered steady 
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increases over the last decade. Anti-American attitudes may have serious repercussions on 
the value of US MNCs through risk and cash flows.  For example, such attitudes may 
dampen the location-specific advantages of an MNC both by raising transaction costs and 
by altering product demand. Anti-American sentiments may raise a firm’s transaction costs 
by requiring extra security arrangements to protect capital assets and personnel, impacting 
hiring and productivity, or providing additional challenges to a firm in hiring local 
residents who may be averse to working for a US-based company. Additionally, there would 
likely be a higher cost of moving US managers to a country that may be less friendly to 
Americans. Changes in attitudes also increase the unpredictability of foreign markets, 
raising uncertainty around critical investment decisions.  
Similarly, perceptions of the US abroad may impact product demand as consumers 
in a host country may choose not to support a US-based firm by boycotting its products.1 
International marketing literature suggests that consumers not only hold stereotype 
images of different countries and products made therein, but these images affect their 
product choices and evaluations (Nagashima, 1970, 1977; Han and Terpstra, 1988; Han, 
1989; Roth and Romeo, 1992). This country image effect is shaped by a consumer’s 
perception of economic, technological, and political development of a particular country 
(Martin and Eroglu, 1993) and is intricately linked with consumer attitude.2 Therefore, 
                                                 
1 For example, the failure of McDonald’s to run a profitable business in Bolivia and its subsequent exit 
in the early 2000s is widely attributed to a cultural boycott originating in a basic failure to adjust to local 
market conditions. 
2 Studies on country image unanimously conclude that consumers hold different perceptions about 
various countries (Nagashima, 1970, 1977; Narayana, 1981; Cattin et al., 1982; Papadopoulos et al., 1990). 
Whether these perceptions impact consumers’ product selection is a much debated issue and the evidence is 
mixed, at best. Johansson, Douglas, and Nonaka (1985) and Johansson and Nebenzahl (1986) find the impact to 
be minor, while others, such as Han and Terpstra (1988), conclude country image to be very influential. While 
actual product choices could be influenced by a combination of country image and product image (i.e., 
consumers’ overall perception of the products from a particular country), the former remains a useful predictor 
of a product’s demand in the foreign market. 
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anti-US sentiment has the potential to substantially alter demand conditions through an 
adverse country image effect, thereby affecting the cash-flows of US-based MNCs.3    
A casual inspection of the Pew data for the last decade reveals that global opinion 
about the US has changed in response to occurrences of global geo-political importance such 
as the global economic downturn, heightened cultural sensitivity, corporate scandals, a 
deterioration of trust in capital markets, and government policy decisions such as the War 
on Terror. To the extent that ‘anti’ attitudes spill-over to market demand for American 
brands (through protests, boycotts, or even quiet avoidance), changes in attitudes raise 
additional costs to US MNCs by raising the unpredictability of the host market. Faced with 
this uncertainty, MNCs are likely to undertake risk-reduction strategies to immunize 
themselves against such unfavorable conditions. Feinberg and Gupta (2006) convincingly 
argue that tighter integration of the subsidiary with the local market through the use of 
intangible assets is likely to be the strategy of choice. 
Since value maximization is the objective of multinational corporations, it is 
important to understand how MNCs utilize these intangible assets, such as technological 
know-how, patents, marketing expertise, managerial skills, and consumer goodwill, in a 
host country to improve value in their global operation. In this paper, we assert that firms 
that are able to internalize markets for the transfer of these assets are better equipped 
than others to adapt to and capitalize on adverse global attitudes. First, our results suggest 
that anti-American attitudes in host countries reduce firm value (measured by the log of 
the ratio of firm’s total value to imputed value) of US MNCs. More importantly, we find 
that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are location-
                                                 
3 The Edelman Trust Barometer (2006) reports that the nationalities of MNCs do matter, and that the 
trust discount for iconic US brands operating in Europe is sizable. For example, while Procter & Gamble (P&G) 
boasts a 70% trustworthiness rating in the US, it only gets 38% in Germany and 29% in Spain. This discount 
seems particularly pronounced for consumer-facing brands: McDonald’s is trusted by 51% of US opinion leaders, 
but only by 24% in France and 28% in Britain. Similarly, Heinz’s 70% ranking in the US plunges to 31% in 
France and 22% in Italy.  
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specific. These advantages are greater when an MNC’s subsidiary network is more 
concentrated in countries with relatively unfavorable attitudes rather than in countries 
with relatively favorable attitudes toward America. By internalizing the transfer of 
intangible assets, US MNCs are estimated to improve their excess value by 0.400 when 
they are concentrated in areas with lower anti-Americanism. This value improvement 
expands to 0.591 (73% of one standard deviation) when their subsidiaries are concentrated 
in areas with higher anti-Americanism. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on how country-level 
attitudes toward the US affect MNC value. Our results reveal an important facet of 
internalization theory by pointing to the role of country risk in the link between the 
valuation of intangibles and multinationality. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
In the next section, we review the related literature and develop testable hypotheses. A 
description of the data and construction of key variables is provided in Section 3. Section 4 
reports the empirical findings. Section 5 examines the robustness of our anti-Americanism 
index and valuation measure. The last section provides a summary and concluding remarks. 
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Multinationality 
There has been an active debate regarding corporate multinationality and its effect 
on firm value over the past decades. The takeover literature provides evidence in line with 
the value enhancing effects of multinationality (i.e., global expansion). First, it may be 
profitable to explore new sources of demand and to exploit advantages in foreign markets 
where the resources or skills brought in by US MNCs are not available to local competing 
firms. Geographic diversification is usually associated with synergy effects (Arrow, 1975; 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975) and financial synergies resulting 
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from lower costs of internal funds (Nielsen and Melicher, 1973) or increased debt capacity of 
the combined firm. In addition, there are widely accepted views that many firms globalize 
to avoid high tax rates and to enjoy relatively low cost inputs from abroad, especially from 
less developed areas. Thus, global expansion offers multinational firms more possibilities 
for economies of scale. Second, international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) generate 
positive returns to firms when involving undervalued targets. The M&A market is an 
important external mechanism that has a powerful disciplinary effect on corporate 
management (Marris, 1964; Manne, 1965; Jensen, 1993). If a firm has been undervalued 
due to management’s suboptimal strategies for a prolonged period, the firm may become a 
takeover target. The acquirer believes that the target firm can create value by improving 
management or generating opportunities which are not currently available to the target. In 
a recent study, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) show that a non-fundamental decrease 
in the stock price creates a profit opportunity for acquirers, and thus significantly increases 
the probability that the firm will be taken over. 
On the other hand, however, multinationality may be a manifestation of agency 
problems. Global diversification may benefit managers in a variety of ways. For example, 
managers favor a diversified business structure because it reduces the risk of their personal 
wealth portfolio, given their large investment in the firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981). They 
may embark on value destroying expansion to simply increase firm size (Mueller, 1969; 
Jensen, 1986) because compensation is highly correlated with firm size (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Managers also have an incentive to increase 
firm size through M&As to entrench their position within the firm (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007) or to improve their power and prestige 
(Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Managerial hubris may also lead the acquiring manager to 
overpay for the target firm (Roll, 1986). If these private benefits are greater than the 
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manager’s private costs, the firm may choose multinational expansion, even if it is value-
reducing for the firm. 
Information asymmetry problems are likely to be more severe for multinational 
firms due to their complex structures of business operations. The relatively elevated level of 
informational asymmetry provides more room for managers to absorb firm-specific 
information to pursue their own benefits, making it more difficult for shareholders to 
monitor management’s decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop, 1997). Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) suggest that agency 
problems can be fixed only when managers are pressed by internal and external monitoring 
mechanisms. However, the managers of globally diversified firms may be more able to 
derive private benefits that exceed their private costs under a less effective and less 
efficient monitoring mechanism due to high degrees of information asymmetry.  
Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) focus on the causes and consequences of both global 
and industrial diversification. They document that global diversification has increased over 
the period from 1984 to 1997 and find that global diversification results in valuation 
discounts, on average, as does industrial diversification. In addition, firms that are globally 
or industrially diversified experience a downward revision in their excess value, while firms 
that cease being either globally or industrially diversified experience increases in excess 
value. Providing cross-country evidence for more than 3,000 firms, Fauver, Houston, and 
Naranjo (2004) support the findings of Denis et al. (2002). Christophe (1997) also provides 
evidence that multinational firms suffer greater reductions in firm value – measured by 
Tobin’s Q – than domestic firms. 
 
2.2. Global attitudes and firm value 
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There is no dearth of tangible evidence on the varying degrees of estrangement 
between host country consumers and foreign MNCs. In general, globalization is seen as a 
foreign invasion against local culture, tastes and traditions (Moller, 1999). Such adverse 
consumer attitudes are often fixated on the country of origin of a product, even in the highly 
globalized world (Gerth, 2003). A decent body of marketing literature analyzes how 
individual consumers invoke “collective national identities in the process of consumption to 
favor or reject products from other countries” (Wang, 2005).  
A negative association between US policies and consumer behavior in host countries 
emerged from a 2004 survey conducted by Global Market Incite (GMI). The survey asked 
the respondents, “Has your willingness to purchase American products changed as a result 
of recent US foreign policy and military action?” (Roberts, 2004). Nearly 20% of foreign 
consumers said they would avoid selecting US products due to America’s position on foreign 
affairs.4 The Edelman Annual Trust Barometer (2004) indicated that 64% of the French 
and 66% of the Germans were “less likely to purchase” US products. However, a New York 
Times (2004) front-page article reported that little harm was done to the profits of 
McDonalds and Coke abroad.  
Surprisingly, empirical studies systematically investigating the potential effect of 
global attitudes on international firm value have so far been missing. There is, however, a 
related literature on country-risk that unanimously suggests that higher country-risk 
reduces foreign direct investment and, thus, leads to lower MNC ownership stake in foreign 
subsidiaries (Doh, Teegen, and Mudambi, 2004; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden 2005; 
                                                 
4 Out of 1,000 individuals from each of the G8 countries sampled in GMI’s world poll, more than half of 
the non-US respondents had an increasingly negative perception of the US (report available at: 
www.worldpoll.com). According to the survey results, 33% of international consumers said they would definitely 
avoid Barbie dolls, and more than 10% claimed they definitely would not buy Kleenex tissues and other Kleenex 
products in the future. 55% of Japanese and 36% of Germans said they were less likely to visit the US on 
business or leisure after America’s global war on terrorism; 43% of all G8 countries (excluding the US) would 
avoid purchasing Marlboro cigarettes. The increasing popularity of ‘Mecca Cola’ in the Arab world as a political 
protest brand against Coca Cola is another case in point. 
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Wei, 2000).  Various aspects of country-risk pervade foreign firms’ operations affecting their 
profitability. For example, country-specific risk arising from the socio-political-economic 
environment, such as the threat of a terrorist attack, looming political crisis, bureaucratic 
inefficiency, corruption, and the imposition of unnecessary trade restrictions, can have a 
potentially adverse impact on an MNC’s operation.  
We conjecture that global attitudes toward Americans and the US are highly related 
to several types of aforementioned country-level risk. Therefore, it follows that global 
attitudes may have an important role in the link between the valuation of intangibles and 
multinationality. 
 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, anti-Americanism in foreign countries where US MNCs’ 
subsidiaries are located has a negative effect on MNCs’ value.  
 
2.2. Global attitudes and internalization theory 
Internalization theory suggests that firms increase value by internalizing markets 
for the transfer of intangibles across country borders. Intangible assets include 
technological know-how, patents, marketing expertise, managerial skills, and consumer 
goodwill. The value of intangible assets is, in general, positively related to the scale of the 
firm’s markets.  
A firm possessing high levels of intangible assets can reap the benefit of reduction in 
transactions costs by creating intra-firm (i.e., internalizing) markets for such assets. 
Williamson (1975) extensively analyzes the nature of transactions costs involved in using 
the market mechanism for transferring intangibles. In particular, he distinguishes four 
types of transactions costs associated with organizing economic activity via the external 
market: 1) the cost of bringing the parties together, 2) the cost of negotiating the terms of 
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the contract, 3) the cost of writing up a contract, and 4) the cost of overseeing contractual 
terms. 
Due to the magnitude of transaction costs associated with the transfer of proprietary 
knowledge-based advantages across borders, foreign direct investment in wholly-owned (or 
majority-owned) subsidiaries can be less expensive than organizing the transfer by way of 
contracting in the external market. Therefore, the greater the MNC’s reliance on intangible 
assets, the greater is the possibility that it will attempt to expand geographically through a 
network of majority-owned subsidiaries in foreign countries. In line with internalization 
theory, Morck and Yeung (1991) find that foreign investment increases firm value in the 
presence of intangible assets.  
In this paper, we argue that transaction costs (that is, the rent foregone by a 
subsidiary to protect itself from the uncertain and adverse economic and political conditions 
in the host country) are higher in areas with unfavorable attitudes toward Americans 
compared to those with favorable attitudes.5 Consequently, we argue that the efficiency 
benefits (in terms of lower transactions costs) from creating internal markets for the 
transfer of intangibles should be greater in areas with unfavorable attitudes. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of anti-Americanism on US MNC value is significantly 
smaller (larger) for firms with a higher (lower) level of intangible assets.  
 
We proceed to the empirical design and testing of the above hypotheses in the 
sections following the description of our sample and measures. 
 
3. Data and measures 
                                                 
5 More specifically, transaction costs in the present context would arise due to expenses relating to 
maintaining market share and/or customer loyalty, ensuring security of staff and property, attracting the best 
local talent, countering negative propaganda by competitors, etc. 
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3.1. Data sources and sample selection 
We extract global attitudes data for 2001 – 2008 from the Pew Research Center’s 
Global Attitudes Project (http://pewglobal.org). The Pew Research Center is an organization 
that provides information on issues, attitudes, and trends shaping the US and the world. 
The Global Attitudes Project (GAP) is one of its seven large projects. Through the GAP, the 
Center conducts public-opinion surveys around the world on a broad array of important 
issues of the day. Since its inception, the GAP has surveyed more than 270,000 people in 57 
countries. The GAP provides numerous reports, analyses, and other releases on topics 
including attitudes toward the US and American foreign policy, globalization, terrorism, 
and democracy.  
We hand-collect information on US multinational corporations’ foreign subsidiaries 
from Dun and Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom, which provides foreign affiliate information. 
We require that firms have information on foreign sales in Compustat and have at least one 
foreign affiliate recorded in Dun and Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom.  We initially identify 
2,496 MNCs that satisfy these requirements. 
Financial data are collected from Compustat and information related to stock price 
is extracted from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. We require 
that financial data be available for each MNC in every year. This requirement reduces the 
number of firms in the sample to 2,114 for the period 2001 – 2008. 
 
3.2. Measures 
3.2.1. Anti-Americanism 
The GAP conducted cross-country public-opinion surveys on various topics including 
“US Image.” There are six questions in the surveys on US image abroad: (i) Opinion of the 
US, (ii) Opinion of the American people, (iii) Opinion of US’s consideration of other 
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countries’ interests, (iv) Confidence in the US President, (v) US-led anti-terrorism efforts, 
and (vi) Support for the war in Afghanistan.6  We use questions (i) – (iii) for two reasons. 
First, we believe opinions expressed in these questions capture the essence of ‘attitude’ that 
we are trying to measure, while the rest are not relevant for this purpose. Second, the other 
questions tend to have smaller sample sizes either due to a smaller time period or the cross-
section of countries surveyed. For example, question (vi) begins in 2007, while the 
observations for question (v) are sparse except for years 2002 and 2007. 
Another feature of the attitude survey data is the presence of ‘non-response’. Even 
though ‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’ are mutually exclusive categories, for most country-
years, the proportion of these responses do not sum to 100%. This is due mainly to “refusal 
to answer” to the survey questions by the respondents, the magnitude of which may not be 
randomly distributed across countries and over time.7 In fact, people with a hostile attitude 
towards America may very well be over-represented among this non-responding group, 
instilling a downward bias in the reported ‘unfavorable’ proportions.8 To avoid the ‘non-
response bias,’ we refrain from directly using unfavorable views as a measure of negative 
attitude. Instead, we redefine negative attitude (ANTI) by subtracting the proportion of 
                                                 
6 Survey questions (i) and (ii) ask if the respondent has a ‘very favorable’, ‘somewhat favorable’, 
‘somewhat unfavorable or ‘very unfavorable’ opinion. The reported ‘favorable’ measure combines ‘very favorable’ 
and ‘somewhat favorable’ responses, while ‘unfavorable’ combines ‘very unfavorable’, ‘somewhat unfavorable’ in 
the Pew database. For question (iii), the respondents are asked about the extent to which they think the US 
takes into account the interests of other countries around the world in making international policy decisions, 
and the response categories are – ‘a great deal’, a ‘fair amount’, ‘not too much’, or ‘not at all’. The first two 
categories are combined in ‘great deal/fair amount,’ while the last two categories are combined in ‘not too 
much/not at all’.  
7 The other form of response is “don’t know” or “don’t have an opinion.” But the proportion of this 
category of response is much lower across all surveys. 
8 There is evidence in the survey literature that participants with extreme opinions about an issue are 
less likely to respond to survey items that ask about that topic (e.g. Raaijmaken, 1999). Furthermore, the 
literature on behavioral economics indicates people with adverse attitudes (e.g. low trust) are likely to be more 
non-responsive to surveys than those who have favorable attitudes (e.g. high trust) (see Rostila, 2007). This 
indicates that non-respondents are more likely to have adverse attitudes towards the U.S. in the present 
context. 
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favorable views from 1. We observe that answers from the three survey questions (i) to (iii) 
are positively correlated in each sample year. 
We construct a firm-level index to measure the overall exposure of an MNC to anti-
Americanism, ANTIi,t, which is computed as the weighted sum of country-level ANTI values: 
 
 = × 
 
 
∑ ∑
, ,
, ,
, ,
foreign
i j t
foreigni t j t
i j tj
j
SUBANTI ANTISUB  (1) 
where i, j and t represent firm, country, and year, respectively and SUB is the number of 
foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, ANTIj,t is country j’s anti-Americanism score in year t and 
high values of ANTIj,t indicate the seriousness of negative perception in country j in year t. 
Note that this ANTIi,t measure captures exposure of firm i in year t to three dimensions: 
,
Americans
i tANTI  (based on views about Americans), ,USi tANTI  (based on views about the US), or 
,
consideration
i tANTI  (based on views about US consideration of other countries’ interests). The 
weight for country j for MNC i is computed as the of the number of the firm’s foreign 
subsidiaries located in country j divided by the total number of foreign subsidiaries of MNC 
i. Thus, MNCs with a large number of subsidiaries in high anti-Americanism countries and 
only a few subsidiaries in low-anti-Americanism countries will have a high index, 
indicating high exposure to anti-Americanism in its foreign operations. Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom provides foreign affiliate information but does not include 
accounting or financial data. Recent papers (e.g., Pantzalis, Park, and Sutton, 2008) have 
used the number of foreign subsidiaries in studying firms’ global expansion. 9 
                                                 
9 While the extent of anti-Americanism may vary across countries for other reasons, we limit the 
exposure of an MNC to the number of subsidiaries in each country of location. Another way of calculating the 
weight of country j is using the proportion of foreign sales in a country relative to the firm’s total sales.  
Unfortunately, we do not have country-level sales data for our sample.  Using an alternate measure of exposure, 
we address this issue in our robustness tests in Section 5.3.  
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To fully utilize all the information available from these three measures and, at the 
same time, alleviate the impact of outliers, we calculate an anti-Americanism index value (
,
index
i tANTI ) for each firm by computing the average of all three ANTIi,t measures discussed 
above. 
 
3.2.2. Valuation 
We utilize the excess value measure introduced by Berger and Ofek (1995).10 We 
define EXVALUEi,t as the natural log of the ratio of the firm’s total value to imputed value.  
EXVALUEi,t 
 
 
 
,
,
i t
imputed
i t
CAPITAL= ln CAPITAL  (2) 
where CAPITALi,t is the sum of common equity, preferred stock, plus the book value of debt 
for firm i in year t, and ,imputedi tCAPITAL  is the product of the firm’s SALES and the firm’s 
primary industry-median ratio of CAPITAL to SALES. We assign firms into industries 
based on two-digit SIC codes.  
A positive (negative) value of EXVALUE indicates that the market assigns a value 
for the firm that is higher (lower) than what would be the industry benchmark-based value. 
Alternatively the EXVALUE expression in (2) can be written as: 
EXVALUEi,t 
( )
( )
 
 
 
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,
,
i t
m t
CAPITAL
SALES= ln CAPITAL
SALES
 (3) 
Therefore, the excess value of the firm i is the natural log of the ratio of firm’s sales-
adjusted total capital to the primary industry’s median (m) sales-adjusted total capital.  
                                                 
10  An alternative measure of firm value is Tobin’s Q. However, this measure has a number of 
drawbacks, one of which is that it is likely to be strongly correlated with growth opportunities of firms (see 
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  These growth opportunities, in turn, are likely influence MNCs’ industrial 
diversification strategies, potentially instilling an ‘endogeneity’ bias in our estimation. Therefore, the excess 
value measure is superior for our purpose. We use Tobin’s Q as an alternative measure to test the robustness of 
our results in section 5.2. 
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4. Empirical results 
In this section, we design the test methods and provide empirical evidence on the 
effects of anti-Americanism on the valuation of US multinational corporations. 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the paper. 
The average values of ANTIAmericans and ANTIUS are 0.320 and 0.446, respectively. This 
evidence shows that global attitudes toward America are less favorable than attitudes 
toward Americans. The average score for ANTIconsideration is notably higher at 0.688. From 
our data, we observe that this pattern is particularly evident in Western countries and 
Middle Eastern countries. People from these parts of the world seem quite critical of the 
United States’ consideration of other countries’ interests. In particular, respondents from 
European countries more strongly believe that the US gives little consideration to the 
interests of other countries when making foreign policy decisions, while displaying 
relatively more tolerance in their ratings of Americans and the US itself. 
We define intangibles intensity (INTS) as the sum of R&D expense and advertising 
expense scaled by sales.  Generally, MNCs in our sample spend 9.8% of their total revenues 
on R&D and advertising. The mean book value of total assets is $2.3 billion. We find that 
they have an average of 11.759 foreign subsidiaries and 53% are industrially diversified. 
The next variables are the instrumental variables used in the first-stage of a model 
that estimates a firm’s ANTI index. We find that 33% of firms in the same SIC two-digit 
industry are conglomerates and their sales account for 67% of industry sales. There are 
3,360 mergers and acquisitions per year and their total value is around $1.1 trillion 
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dollars.11 Over the sample period, the average growth rate of real GDP is about 2.1% and, 
on average, there are 2.2 recession months per year. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
Panel B of Table 1 reports pairwise correlation coefficients between the main 
variables, which provide preliminary evidence on the relations we explore in the following 
sections. First, we find that anti-Americanism is negatively and statistically significantly 
associated with MNC valuation, strongly supporting Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the degree 
of intangible intensity is positively associated with firm value. The correlation coefficient 
between EXVALUE and INTS is 0.367 with the 1% significance level. This evidence is in 
line with the findings of other studies (e.g. Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Denis et al., 2002). 
We also find a value discount related to industrial diversification and geographical 
expansion. Both the industrial diversification (DIVERS) and the total number of foreign 
subsidiaries (FS) are negatively associated with firm value, which support prior evidence 
(Lang and Stulz, 1994; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Denis et al., 
2002). 
 
4.2. Anti-Americanism and valuation of multinational corporations 
We now examine the effect of anti-Americanism in regression models. One 
important issue in regression analysis is that the choice to expand into hostile countries 
might not be exogenous because firms carefully choose the location of their operation. . 
Furthermore, it may be the case that only firms with high growth opportunities feel 
confident enough to subject themselves to the potential hostility of operating in an anti-
American environment. Thus, the estimation of coefficients using OLS may be biased 
                                                 
11 Because both MNUM and MVOL are log-transformed variables, we use exponential functions of the 
median values to compute 3,360 mergers and acquisitions per year (i.e., exp(8.120) – 1) and their total value is 
around $1.1 trillion dollars (i.e., exp(27.740) – 1), respectively. 
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because it is possible that some variables are highly correlated with a firm’s selection of 
countries (e.g. Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). In fact, Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, 
Lemmon and Wolf (2002), and Villalonga (2004) find a value premium from diversification 
after controlling for endogeneity and selection bias in managers’ decision to diversify into 
other lines of business, while many early studies find a value discount (e.g. Denis et al., 
2002). We therefore utilize a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression to account for the 
endogenous relation when we estimate the effect of anti-Americanism on firm value. 
In the first stage of the model, we select the variables following Campa and Kedia 
(2002) and use them to estimate firm-level anti-Americanism (ANTIindex). We use a Tobit 
regression instead of OLS because the dependent variable, ANTIindex, is bounded by 0 and 1. 
The first set of instruments, which are ‘included’ in the second stage as well, relate to firm 
characteristics such as size, leverage, capital expenditure, and diversification. The second 
set of ‘excluded’ instruments consists of business environment variables: the fraction of all 
firms in the industry that are conglomerates (PNDIV); the fraction of industry sales 
accounted for by conglomerates (PSDIV); the log-transformed number of announced 
mergers and acquisitions in the year (MNUM); the log-transformed US dollar value of 
announced mergers and acquisitions in the year (MVOL); the growth rate in real GDP 
(GDPG); and the number of recession months in the year (CONTR). 
,
index
i tANTI  = γ0 + γ1 SIZEi,t + γ2 LEVi,t + γ3 CAPXSi,t + γ4 DIVERS i,t + γ5 PNDIVi,t 
 + γ6 PSDIVi,t + γ7 MVOLt + γ8 MNUMt + γ9 GDPGt + γ10 CONTRt  
+ ei,t, (4) 
where SIZE denotes log of one plus total assets, LEV indicates leverage, measured as a 
fraction of long-term debt in total assets, CAPXS represents the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales, DIVERS is an indicator of industrial diversification that takes a 
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value of 1 if the firm has more than one industry segment and 0 otherwise. Next, we use 
the estimated ANTIindex and the set of included instruments in the second-stage model to 
explain firm value. 
EXVALUEi,t = b0 + b1 ,indexi tANTI  + b2 SIZEi,t + b3 LEVi,t + b4 CAPXSi,t  
+ b5 DIVERSi,t + ei,t, (5) 
where EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of total market value to 
imputed value.  
We present the results of the two-stage model in Table 2. In the first-stage, we find 
that most of the variables we control for are highly correlated with the firm-level anti-
Americanism index. The results in model 1 of Table 2 show that larger, more leveraged, and 
industrially diversified firms are more likely to expand their businesses into more anti-
American countries. The significant and positive coefficients of PSDIV, MVOL, and MNUM 
indicate that firms tend to diversify into more anti-Americanism areas when they belong to 
industries dominated by conglomerates and other firms engage in more mergers and 
acquisitions.  We use the predicted value of ANTI index from model 1 for our multivariate 
analyses. 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
In model 2, the coefficient of ANTIindex is negative and statistically significant, 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. It indicates that MNCs destroy value when they enter 
markets where people present severe anti-Americanism. The coefficients of other control 
variables show the expected signs. Market valuation is positively related to size and 
negatively related to leverage. Capital expenditure adjusted by sales is positively associated 
with firm value. The coefficient of industry diversification (DIVERS) is negative and 
significant, consistent with the pairwise correlation result of Table 1. 
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4.3. Anti-Americanism, intangibles, and valuation of multinational corporations 
The cost that anti-Americanism imposes can vary across firms. Individual firms that 
have a foothold in high anti-Americanism markets may benefit from the difficulty other 
competitors may find in operating in or even entering such markets, thus giving them a 
captive market. A firm’s assets, especially intangible assets, which are helpful in dealing 
with such difficulty, are crucial in this paradigm. 
Therefore, we test Hypothesis 2 by examining the joint effects of anti-Americanism 
and intangible asset intensity (INTS) on firm value. Based on the literature (e.g., Morck 
and Yeung, 1991), we use research and development spending as a proxy for technical 
expertise (i.e., technological know-how and patents) and advertising expenditures as a 
proxy for marketing expertise and consumer goodwill. In Table 3, we compare firms’ excess 
values based on intangibles intensity and exposure to anti-Americanism in their foreign 
operations. In each year, firms with values higher (lower) than the median are assigned to 
the high (low) group.  
The averages of the valuation measures show that intangibles intensity is positively 
associated with firm value. We find that firm values are highest when firms have high 
intangibles intensity and a high anti-Americanism index. The value effect of 
multinationality is a function of the firm’s level of intangible assets. We find that global 
expansion from low ANTI areas to high ANTI areas can destroy firm value when firms do 
not have the ability to exploit internal markets for the transfer of intangible assets (i.e., 
have low levels of intangibles and enter high anti-Americanism areas). The difference in 
EXVALUE, -0.124, is significant at the 1% level (t = -2.70). However, this significant and 
negative effect of expanding into high anti-Americanism areas is not evident in firms with 
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high levels of intangibles. For these firms, excess value actually increases by 0.068 (t = 
1.38).  
Importantly, the results show that the internalization effect is stronger in the case 
of high anti-Americanism. The value difference is 0.400 (t = 8.46) for low anti-Americanism 
index firms. However, the value improvement expands to 0.591 (t = 12.41) for high anti-
Americanism index firms, which is equivalent to 73% of one standard deviation. We find 
the same patterns, but more evident results, when we use the estimated ANTIindex to 
classify the sample firms in Panel B. Therefore, the univariate findings from Table 3 
provide evidence to support the prediction that internalizing the transfer of intangibles 
generates greater value in high anti-Americanism areas.  
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
We continue to test these relations in multivariate regressions in Table 4. In model 
1, we find that INTS is positively related to firm value, consistent with the findings in the 
previous tests. We show in Table 1 that the correlation coefficient between EXVALUE and 
INTS is positive and significant at the 1% significance level. In addition, the univariate test 
in Table 3 documents that average excess value is positive when firms possess greater 
intangibles intensity compared to others, while average excess value is negative for the low 
INTS group. The positive association of intangible assets to firm value has been widely 
reported in prior research as well (e.g., Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Denis et al., 2002). 
Although it remains similar when ANTIindex is included in model 2, the coefficient turns 
negative when it is interacted with ANTIindex in model 3. This evidence is interesting 
because it suggests that the effect of intangible assets on firm value is not universally the 
same for all MNCs. Consistent with other test findings, it seems clear that intangible assets 
are much more valuable when MNCs have more business in anti-American environments. 
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In contrast, intangible assets are negatively associated with value when firms have a very 
low anti-Americanism index, indicating that expenditures on intangible assets, which are 
not as valuable in a US-friendly market network, can even destroy an MNC’s value.  
Model 3 includes estimated ANTIindex, INTS, and their interaction. We expect that 
the internalization of intangibles generates greater value enhancement when US 
multinational corporations operate primarily in high anti-Americanism areas than when 
they operate primarily in low anti-Americanism areas. Therefore, the coefficient on the 
interaction term between estimated anti-Americanism and intangibles intensity (ANTIindex 
* INTS) is predicted to be positive. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the 
coefficient of the interaction is positive and significant, which is also in line with 
Hypothesis 2 related to internalization theory. This evidence provides strong support for 
the complementarity between the two – the notion that the value of anti-Americanism 
stems, at least in part, from the possession of intangible assets and the value of intangible 
assets increases with the degree of anti-Americanism. The internalization benefits are such 
that MNCs are able to add value through diversification once they have a sufficient amount 
of intangibles. For example, model 3 suggests that when a firm has an intangibles-to-sales 
ratio of 20.5% or higher, exposure to anti-Americanism adds value to the firm (i.e., the 
effect in the regression = -3.872 + 18.889*INTS > 0). 
We additionally use Heckman’s selection correction to estimate the effect of an 
endogenously chosen binary anti-Americanism treatment by defining high anti-
Americanism to be firms belonging to the top tercile of the ANTIIndex. From the treatment 
effect model, we find results similar to the ones reported in Tables 2 and 4. Anti-
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Americanism is generally found to have a negative value impact on MNCs. However, the 
negative effect is mainly explained by firms with low levels of intangible assets.12  
 
5. Robustness 
5.1. Individual anti-Americanism measures and rank-based index 
We conduct robustness checks to determine whether or not the previous findings are 
driven by the construction of ANTIindex or by the particular method in which we measure 
firm value. First, we retest the main models using the three individual estimated anti-
Americanism measures that are used in the construction of ANTIindex. Second, we create a 
rank-based index. In the original index, we compute the average of the three individual 
measures to aggregate their informativeness. In this new index, we rank each firm in the 
sample by the magnitude of each of the anti-Americanism variables. Then, we compute a 
new anti-Americanism index as the average of all the ranks of the three different measures. 
This composite measure, therefore, is defined as follows: 
= ∑
,
,
,
,
( )1_
i t k kK
t i tindex
i t k
k=1i t t
Rank ANTI
ANTI Rank
K N
, (6) 
where ,( )k kt i tRank ANTI  is the rank function that assigns the rank for each observation from 
the least anti-value to the most anti-value. ,ki tANTI  is the kth measure of anti-Americanism 
for firm i in year t, and Ki,t denotes the dimension of measures. For each variable, the firm 
with the most anti-value is ranked as ktN  while the firm with the least anti-value is ranked 
as one. The denominator, Ki,t, averages the ranks in the sample. In our sample, 2,114 firms 
have three anti-Americanism measures and therefore ktN  = 2,114 and Ki,t = 3 for all i in 
year t. 
                                                 
12 These results are left out of the paper for the sake of brevity, but are available upon request. 
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[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
We replicate the last columns in Tables 2 and 4. As reported in Table 5, we obtain similar 
results when we repeat the tests using the individual anti-Americanism measures and the 
rank-based index. The coefficient of ANTIindex is negative, while that of interaction term 
ANTIindex * INTS is positive. All coefficients on the key variables are significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
5.2. Alternative measures of valuation 
Next, we retest the models measuring firm value in different ways. First, we use 
Tobin’s Q following the Chung and Pruitt (1994) measure, which is computed as [market 
value of common equity + preferred stock liquidating value + long-term debt – (short-term 
assets – short-term liabilities)] / total assets. However, it is possible that firms with high 
ANTI indices are more likely to have a higher degree of intangibles, which may lead to 
higher Tobin's Q and an upward bias. Second, we address this potential bias by adjusting 
Tobin’s Q by adding intangibles to total assets in the denominator. Third, we use the Fama-
French 49 industry classification instead of two-digit SIC when we compute industry 
median sales-adjusted total capital. Though not shown in a table, we find that the 
additional results have similar consistent patterns of coefficients, and thus the previous 
results are confirmed by alternative measures of firm value.13  
 
5.3. Sales-based multinationality and the value impact of anti-Americanism 
In our current anti-Americanism index, we measure how exposed a particular firm is 
to anti-Americanism as the weighted average of anti-Americanism in countries in which the 
firms has foreign subsidiaries [see equation (1)]. It could be argued, however, that the mere 
                                                 
13 These results are available upon request. 
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presence of a subsidiary in an anti-American market may not accurately capture a firm’s 
true exposure to anti-Americanism. For example, suppose that there are some firms with 
high business exposure (e.g., sales) in areas with high levels of anti-Americanism that also 
tend to have more subsidiaries in countries with low levels of anti-Americanism. In that 
case, the measure we use will systematically underestimate the anti-Americanism of these 
firms. Thus, it is preferred to measure anti-Americanism by estimating how much a firm’s 
business is actually done in each of its overseas subsidiaries.   
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
To account for this issue, we create a new sample by collecting foreign sales data 
from Compustat’s geographic segment file. To match with the Pew Research Center’s global 
attitude data, we require firms have segment information for single countries, not for broad 
geographic regions. As computed with the main anti-Americanism measures, we compute 
the sum over the weighted anti-Americanism scores. To assign a weight to a particular 
foreign country, we use the proportion of firm sales in the country instead of the number of 
foreign subsidiaries: ( )= ×∑, , , , ,foreigni t i j t i t j t
j
ANTI SALES SALES ANTI , where ANTIj,t is 
country j’s anti-Americanism score in year t. The weight for country j is computed as the 
amount of a firm’s foreign sales in country j divided by the total sales of MNC i.  ANTIi,t 
represents one of three measures: ,Americansi tANTI  (based on views about Americans), ,USi tANTI  
(based on views about the US), or ,considerationi tANTI  (based on views about US consideration of 
other countries’ interests). To fully capture all the information available from these three 
dimensions, we calculate the index value ( ,indexi tANTI ) for each firm by obtaining the average 
of all three measures. 
Table 6 reports the regression results with the anti-Americanism index based on 
foreign sales. We find that our previous results are not altered. Estimated anti-
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Americanism is negatively associated with excess value, while the effect interacted with 
intangibles intensity is positive. Overall, the results are consistent with the ones obtained 
in other tables where we use foreign subsidiaries in the construction of ANTI measures. 
Therefore, we conclude that, although our proxy for anti-Americanism does not perfectly 
capture true exposure, our results are not very sensitive to the way we measure our index 
of firm-level anti-Americanism.  
 
5.4. Number of foreign subsidiaries and the value impact of anti-Americanism 
Finally, we test anti-Americanism on MNC value utilizing a measure of global 
expansion based on the number of foreign subsidiaries as done in other studies (e.g., Morck 
and Yeung, 1991). In this framework, we include a log-transformation of total number of 
foreign subsidiaries (Log(1+FS)), intangible intensity (INTS), and their interaction 
(Log(1+FS) * INTS) as key independent variables, but split the sample by the estimated 
ANTIindex obtained from Table 2. In each year, we classify the sample firms as high 
ANTIindex if they are ranked in the top 50% of ANTIindex rankings, while the remaining firms 
are classified as the low ANTIindex group. We conduct separate regressions for all MNCs, 
high ANTIindex MNCs, and low ANTIindex MNCs. Consistent with our previous findings, we 
expect that the internalization of intangibles generates greater value-enhancement when 
US multinational corporations operate primarily in high anti-Americanism areas than 
when they operate primarily in low anti-Americanism areas. Therefore, the coefficient on 
Log(1+FS) * INTS is predicted to be greater for high ANTIindex firms.  
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
Table 7 documents that the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between 
intangibles intensity and multinationality is positive and significant when we include all 
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MNCs in the regression, supporting the internalization theory. We also find that the 
magnitude is larger for high ANTIindex firms, while it becomes insignificant for low ANTIindex 
firms. The coefficient on the interaction term increases substantially from 0.036 (MNCs 
with low ANTIindex) to 0.825 (MNCs with high ANTIindex). Our findings from Table 7 further 
suggest that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are 
greater in the presence of unfavorable attitudes. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
There has been an active debate regarding corporate multinationality and its effect 
on firm value over the past few decades. Internalization theory suggests that multinational 
corporations gain value from their ability to arrange intra-firm cross-border transfers of 
knowledge-based intangible assets such as technological know-how and marketing 
expertise, rather than relying exclusively on external markets that constitute a more 
expensive mode of transaction. This paper, for the first time in the literature, provides solid 
evidence in support of internalization theory by examining the effect of global attitudes on 
the benefits MNCs derive from internalizing the advantages of intangible assets. 
We collect global attitudes data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes 
Project, which provides data on topics including attitudes toward the US, Americans, and 
American foreign policy. Using hand-collected data on US MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries from 
Dun and Bradstreet’s issue of Who Owns Whom, we examine the relationship between US 
MNCs’ valuation and anti-Americanism in the countries where MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries 
are located.  
Controlling for the endogenous decision to expand into anti-American areas, we find 
that MNCs destroy value when they enter markets where people show severe anti-
Americanism.  Investigating the connection between internalization and anti-Americanism, 
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we find that geographic diversification into severe anti-American countries significantly 
increases firm value for MNCs with high levels of intangibles, measured by research and 
development and advertising expenditures. However, we do not find these beneficial effects 
of internalization when MNCs operate in US-friendly countries. This is attributed to the 
fact that the benefits to MNCs from creating internal markets for intangibles are lower 
when market conditions are more favorable. Based on our findings, we conclude that the 
advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are greater in the 
presence of unfavorable attitudes. This paper provides a first step in unraveling the impact 
of global attitudes on the valuation of multinational firms, the value effects of becoming 
geographically diversified, and enriches our understanding of the role of intangible assets 
in this context. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics and Correlation Coefficients. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 2,114 firm-year observations 
over the period 2001-2008. The anti-Americanism score is computed as the sum over the weighted anti-Americanism scores.  
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where ANTIj,t is country j’s anti-Americanism score in year t. The weight for country j is computed as the ratio of a firm’s foreign 
subsidiaries located in country j divided by the total number of foreign subsidiaries of MNC i. We use three scores (ANTIAmericans, ANTIUS, 
and ANTIconsideration) and compute the average of three scores to get the anti-Americanism index (ANTIindex), where ANTIAmericans (ANTIUS) 
is a view of Americans (a view of the US) and ANTIconsideration is a view of US consideration of other countries’ interests. FS = the total 
number of foreign subsidiaries (∑ , ,foreigni j tj SUB ). INTS = intangibles intensity and computed as a sum of R&D expense and advertising 
expense scaled by sales. EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of firm’s total value to imputed value. TA = total assets 
($ millions). LEV = leverage, measured as long-term debt / total assets. CAPXS = the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. DIVERS = a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has more than one industry segment and 0 otherwise. PNDIV = the fraction of 
conglomerates in the SIC two-digit industry. PSDIV = the fraction of sales by diversified firms in the SIC two-digit industry. MVOL = the 
log of one plus the value of announced mergers and acquisitions. MNUM = the log of one plus the number of merger and acquisition 
announcements. GDPG = the growth rate in real GDP. CONTR = the number of recession months in the year. Panel B reports pairwise 
correlation coefficients [p-values]. *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile Maximum 
ANTIindex 0.485 0.064 0.312 0.445 0.495 0.525 0.790 
ANTIAmericans 0.320 0.070 0.180 0.282 0.320 0.352 0.740 
ANTIUS 0.446 0.092 0.230 0.382 0.456 0.510 0.840 
ANTIconsideration 0.688 0.073 0.465 0.646 0.688 0.735 0.890 
FS 11.759 14.642 1.000 3.000 6.000 14.000 96.000 
INTS 0.098 0.135 0.000 0.013 0.054 0.153 1.996 
EXVALUE -0.041 0.809 -3.107 -0.524 0.000 0.438 2.836 
TA 2287 4995 6.802 258 796 2187 65458 
LEV 0.127 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.223 0.951 
CAPXS 0.047 0.065 0.001 0.018 0.030 0.049 0.730 
DIVERS 0.527 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PNDIV 0.331 0.090 0.041 0.269 0.318 0.371 0.833 
PSDIV 0.671 0.145 0.036 0.635 0.706 0.768 0.979 
MVOL 27.787 0.489 26.983 27.245 27.740 28.038 28.435 
MNUM 8.132 0.155 7.927 8.014 8.120 8.159 8.478 
GDPG 0.021 0.013 -0.014 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.037 
CONTR 2.195 4.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 12.000 
Panel B: Pairwise correlation coefficients 
 EXVALUE ANTIindex INTS TA LEV CAPXS DIVERS 
ANTIindex -0.053** 1      
 [0.015]       
INTS 0.367*** -0.072*** 1     
 [0.000] [0.001]      
TA 0.045** 0.161*** -0.087*** 1    
 [0.039] [0.000] [0.000]     
LEV -0.045** 0.053** -0.168*** 0.087*** 1   
 [0.038] [0.015] [0.000] [0.000]    
CAPXS 0.185*** -0.059*** 0.139*** 0.001 0.056** 1  
 [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.977] [0.011]   
DIVERS -0.136*** 0.124*** -0.288*** 0.188*** 0.231*** -0.082*** 1 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  
FS -0.082*** 0.017 -0.176*** 0.373*** 0.219*** -0.108*** 0.306*** 
 [0.000] [0.447] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
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Table 2 
Anti-Americanism and Valuation of Multinational Corporations. This table reports the results of the two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS) regressions. ANTIindex = the average of ANTIAmericans, ANTIUS, and ANTIconsideration, where 
ANTIAmericans (ANTIUS) is a view of Americans (a view of the US) and ANTIconsideration is a rate on the US’ 
consideration of other countries’ interests. EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of firm’s 
total value to imputed value. SIZE = the log of one plus total assets. LEV = leverage, measured as long-term 
debt / total assets. CAPXS = the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. DIVERS = a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the firm has more than one industry segment and 0 otherwise. PNDIV = the fraction of 
conglomerates in the SIC two-digit industry. PSDIV = the fraction of sales by diversified firms in the SIC two-
digit industry. MVOL = the log of one plus the value of announced mergers and acquisitions. MNUM = the log of 
one plus the number of merger and acquisition announcements. GDPG = the growth rate in real GDP. CONTR 
= the number of recession months in the year. T-statistics in parentheses are computed based on standard 
errors controlling for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent 
variable: 
ANTIindex 
Dependent 
variable: 
EXVALUE 
 Model 1 
First-stage 
Model 2 
Second-stage 
ANTIindex  -2.424*** 
  (-5.44) 
SIZE 0.003*** 0.143*** 
 (3.78) (11.17) 
LEV 0.021** -0.497*** 
 (2.02) (-3.91) 
CAPXS -0.020 1.804*** 
 (-0.86) (5.12) 
DIVERS 0.007*** -0.255*** 
 (3.00) (-7.21) 
PNDIV 0.008  
 (0.70)  
PSDIV 0.030***  
 (4.17)  
MVOL 0.037***  
 (7.60)  
MNUM 0.192***  
 (8.92)  
GDPG 2.374***  
 (5.42)  
CONTR 0.002*  
 (1.95)  
Constant -2.257*** -1.686*** 
 (-25.46) (-5.89) 
N 2,114 2,114 
F-statistic 140.28*** 42.13*** 
R-squared  0.1093 
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Table 3 
Comparisons of Multinational Corporations’ Values. This table reports the mean values of EXVALUE for the 
sub-groups of firms formed after sorting independently on anti-Americanism (ANTIindex) and intangibles 
intensity (INTS). EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of firm’s total value to imputed value. 
ANTIindex = the average of ANTIAmericans, ANTIUS, and ANTIconsideration, where ANTIAmericans (ANTIUS) is a view of 
Americans (a view of the US) and ANTIconsideration is a rate on the US’ consideration of other countries’ interests. 
The estimated ANTIindex is obtained from the first-stage model in Table 2. INTS = intangibles intensity 
computed as a sum of R&D expense and advertising expense scaled by sales. The high group includes firms 
ranked in the highest 1/2 in each year, while the remaining firms are classified in the low group. Also reported 
are mean differences between sub-groups and corresponding t-statistic values in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Classified by ANTIindex and intangible intensity 
 Low 
ANTIindex 
High 
ANTIindex High – Low 
Low intangibles intensity -0.230 -0.354 -0.124*** 
(-2.70) 
High intangibles intensity 0.169 0.237 0.068 
(1.38) 
High – Low 0.400*** 
(8.46) 
0.591*** 
(12.41) 
 
Panel B: Classified by estimated ANTIindex and intangible intensity 
 Low 
estimated ANTIindex 
High 
estimated ANTIindex High – Low 
Low intangibles intensity -0.210 -0.341 -0.131*** 
(-2.81) 
High intangibles intensity 0.149 0.289 0.139*** 
(2.80) 
High – Low 0.359*** 
(7.21) 
0.629*** 
(13.55) 
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Table 4 
Anti-Americanism, Intangibles, and Valuation of Multinational Corporations. This table reports the second-
stage results of the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regressions. The first-stage result is reported in Table 2. 
EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of firm’s total value to imputed value. ANTIindex = the 
average of ANTIAmericans, ANTIUS, and ANTIconsideration, where ANTIAmericans (ANTIUS) is a view of Americans (a 
view of the US) and ANTIconsideration is a rate on the US’ consideration of other countries’ interests. INTS = 
intangibles intensity computed as a sum of R&D expense and advertising expense scaled by sales. SIZE = the 
log of one plus total assets. LEV = leverage, measured as long-term debt / total assets. CAPXS = the ratio of 
capital expenditures to sales. DIVERS = a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has more than one 
industry segment and 0 otherwise. T-statistics in parentheses are computed based on standard errors 
controlling for heteroskedasticity. *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: EXVALUE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ANTIindex  -2.075*** -3.872*** 
  (-4.89) (-7.24) 
ANTIindex * INTS   18.899*** 
   (5.68) 
INTS 2.074*** 2.044*** -6.679*** 
 (11.30) (10.88) (-4.32) 
SIZE 0.132*** 0.145*** 0.148*** 
 (11.38) (12.25) (12.70) 
LEV -0.267** -0.276** -0.290** 
 (-2.26) (-2.35) (-2.49) 
CAPXS 1.409*** 1.285*** 1.351*** 
 (5.05) (4.65) (4.77) 
DIVERS -0.140*** -0.122*** -0.093*** 
 (-4.04) (-3.49) (-2.70) 
Constant -2.898*** -2.170*** -1.406*** 
 (-12.52) (-7.94) (-4.61) 
N 2,114 2,114 2,114 
R-squared 0.2041 0.2132 0.2268 
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Table 5 
Individual Anti-Americanism Measures and Rank-based Index. This table reports the second-stage results of the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regressions where the 
first-stage control for the same variables reported in Table 2. EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of firm’s total value to imputed value. ANTIAmericans = 
a view of Americans. ANTIUS = a view of the US ANTIconsideration is a rate on the US’ consideration of other countries’ interests. ANTI_RANKindex = the rank-based ANTI 
index. INTS = intangibles intensity computed as a sum of R&D expense and advertising expense scaled by sales. SIZE = the log of one plus total assets. LEV = leverage, 
measured as long-term debt / total assets. CAPXS = the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. DIVERS = a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has more than 
one industry segment and 0 otherwise. T-statistics in parentheses are computed based on standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity. *** and ** denote significance 
at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: EXVALUE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
ANTIAmericans -4.198*** -6.954***       
 (-6.11) (-8.67)       
ANTIAmericans * INTS  34.808***       
  (7.04)       
ANTIUS   -1.706*** -2.779***     
   (-5.89) (-7.90)     
ANTIUS * INTS    13.250***     
    (5.92)     
ANTIconsideration     -1.900*** -2.355***   
     (-3.76) (-3.96)   
ANTIconsideration * INTS      10.372***   
      (2.68)   
ANTI_RANKindex       -3.286*** -6.369*** 
       (-3.77) (-7.62) 
ANTI_RANKindex * INTS        22.326*** 
        (5.78) 
INTS  -8.661***  -3.469***  -4.803*  -8.915*** 
  (-5.63)  (-3.66)  (-1.87)  (-4.83) 
SIZE 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.143*** 0.148*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.192*** 0.214*** 
 (11.85) (13.03) (11.21) (12.75) (10.32) (11.80) (9.03) (10.44) 
LEV -0.432*** -0.255** -0.526*** -0.327*** -0.492*** -0.264** -0.423*** -0.192 
 (-3.40) (-2.19) (-4.14) (-2.80) (-3.87) (-2.25) (-3.29) (-1.64) 
CAPXS 1.981*** 1.392*** 1.833*** 1.382*** 1.725*** 1.309*** 1.927*** 1.138*** 
 (5.58) (5.06) (5.21) (4.87) (4.83) (4.53) (5.26) (4.03) 
DIVERS -0.258*** -0.091*** -0.266*** -0.102*** -0.246*** -0.103*** -0.183*** 0.002 
 (-7.32) (-2.67) (-7.54) (-3.00) (-6.86) (-2.91) (-4.20) (0.04) 
Constant -2.088*** -1.510*** -2.080*** -2.021*** -1.247*** -1.379*** -2.263*** -1.449*** 
 (-8.22) (-5.44) (-8.15) (-8.04) (-3.04) (-3.04) (-8.82) (-5.16) 
N 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,114 2,114 
R-squared 0.1122 0.2375 0.1114 0.2305 0.1030 0.2116 0.1035 0.2374 
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Table 6 
Sales-based Multinationality and the Value Impact of Anti-Americanism. This table reports the second-stage 
results of the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regressions where the first-stage control for the same variables 
reported in Table 2. EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of firm’s total value to imputed 
value. ANTIindex = the average of ANTIAmericans, ANTIUS, and ANTIconsideration, where ANTIAmericans (ANTIUS) is a 
view of Americans (a view of the US) and ANTIconsideration is a rate on the US’ consideration of other countries’ 
interests. The anti-Americanism score is computed as the sum over the weighted anti-Americanism scores. 
Foreign sales amounts are used instead of the number of foreign subsidiaries. 
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where ANTIj,t is country j’s anti-Americanism score in year t. The weight for country j is computed as the ratio 
of a firm’s foreign sales in country j divided by the total sales of MNC i. INTS = intangibles intensity computed 
as a sum of R&D expense and advertising expense scaled by sales. SIZE = the log of one plus total assets. LEV = 
leverage, measured as long-term debt / total assets. CAPXS = the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. DIVERS 
= a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has more than one industry segment and 0 otherwise. T-
statistics in parentheses are computed based on standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity. *** and ** 
denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: EXVALUE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ANTIindex  -1.307** -1.535*** -1.620*** 
  (-2.53) (-3.01) (-3.17) 
ANTIindex * INTS    4.795** 
    (2.00) 
INTS 0.708***  0.728*** -0.616 
 (7.65)  (7.67) (-0.89) 
SIZE 0.068*** 0.094*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 
 (7.16) (5.71) (6.64) (6.48) 
LEV -0.146** -0.471*** -0.473*** -0.472*** 
 (-1.65) (-3.21) (-3.28) (-3.25) 
CAPXS 0.522*** 0.753*** 0.798*** 0.798*** 
 (7.41) (6.20) (6.69) (6.71) 
DIVERS 0.012 -0.046 -0.038 -0.034 
 (0.31) (-1.07) (-0.91) (-0.81) 
Constant -1.518*** -1.620*** -1.899*** -1.829*** 
 (-8.00) (-7.19) (-8.42) (-8.03) 
N 1,677 1,677 1,677 1,677 
R-squared 0.0745 0.0535 0.0794 0.0814 
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Table 7 
Anti-Americanism and Global Diversification Effect. This table reports the estimated coefficients of the 
regression of excess value of firms. ANTIindex = the average of ANTIAmericans, ANTIUS, and ANTIconsideration, where 
ANTIAmericans (ANTIUS) is a view of Americans (a view of the U.S.) and ANTIconsideration is a rate on the U.S.’ 
consideration of other countries’ interests. The estimated ANTIindex is obtained from the first-stage model in 
Table 2. The group with high estimated ANTIindex includes firms ranked in the highest 1/2 in each year, while 
the remaining firms are classified in the low group. EXVALUE = excess value, defined as the log of the ratio of 
firm’s total value to imputed value. FS =  the total number of foreign subsidiaries. INTS = intangibles intensity 
computed as a sum of R&D expense and advertising expense scaled by sales. SIZE = the log of one plus total 
assets. LEV = leverage, measured as long-term debt / total assets. CAPXS = the ratio of capital expenditures to 
sales. DIVERS = a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has more than one industry segment and 
0 otherwise. T-statistics in parentheses are computed based on standard errors controlling for 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: EXVALUE 
 All MNCs MNCs with low estimated ANTIindex 
MNCs with high 
estimated ANTIindex 
Log (1+FS) -0.222*** -0.149*** -0.202*** 
 (-9.05) (-3.71) (-6.46) 
Log (1+FS) * INTS 0.644*** 0.036 0.825*** 
 (3.94) (0.15) (3.31) 
INTS 0.978*** 1.580*** 1.327** 
 (3.37) (4.24) (2.47) 
SIZE 0.200*** 0.281*** 0.143*** 
 (13.44) (13.71) (5.94) 
LEV -0.226* -0.448* -0.097 
 (-1.96) (-1.87) (-0.66) 
CAPXS 0.935*** 0.666** 1.164** 
 (3.38) (2.16) (2.15) 
DIVERS -0.110*** 0.042 -0.098* 
 (-3.20) (0.78) (-1.73) 
Constant -3.848*** -5.470*** -2.812*** 
 (-14.10) (-14.44) (-5.90) 
N 2,114 1,056 1,058 
R-squared 0.2370 0.2795 0.2420 
 
 
 
